The Philosophy Of Mind: Classical Problems/contemporary Issues

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The Philosophy of Mind remains the only sourcebook of primary readings offering in-depth coverage of both historical works and contemporary controversies in philosophy of mind. This second edition provides an expanded treatment of classical as well as current topics, with many additional readings and a new section on mental content. The writers included in this comprehensive book, range from Aristotle, Descartes, and William James to such leading contemporary thinkers as Noam Chomsky, Paul and Patricia Churchland, and Jaegwon Kim. The eighty-three selections provide a thorough survey of five areas of enduring controversy: the mind-body problem, mental causation, mental content, innatism and modularity, and associationism and connectionism. Each section includes an introductory overview of the topic by the editors as well as suggestions for further reading. The selections added for the second edition serve both to enhance historical coverage and to update contemporary issues, especially in areas of current empirical research such as connectionism and innatism. Changes to historical coverage include a wider array of readings on classic positions as well as neglected precursors to views often considered recent innovations. The section on the mind-body problem in particular has been greatly expanded, including numerous selections on consciousness and qualia. The book is ideal for graduate courses in philosophy and the history of psychology. It is eminently suited as a reference for researchers and as a self-contained survey for the general reader. Table Of Contents Preface to the Second Edition Sources I The Mind–Body Problem — Introduction A Classic Positions 1 From Metaphysics, Book 7, and On the Soul, Book 2 2 From Meditations on First Philosophy II and VI and Replies to Objections II 3 From An Essay Concerning Human Understanding 4 From The Principles of Human Knowledge 5 From The Monadology 6 From Man aMachine 7 From Positivism 8 From A System of Logic 9 From “Does ‘Consciousness’ Exist?” 10 From “The Province of Functional Psychology” 11 From The Concept of Mind B Materialism(s): Function, Reduction, and Elimination 12 Is Consciousness a Brain Process? 13 The Nature of Mental States 14 Troubles with Functionalism (revised) 15 Minds, Brains, and Programs 16 Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes 17 From Neurophilosophy 18 Multiple Realization and the Metaphysics of Reduction 19 From Language and Problems of Knowledge 20 From The Empirical Stance C Mind and Subjective Experience 21 From Mind and the World Order 22 From “The ‘Mental’ and the ‘Physical’ 23 Sensations and Brain Processes 24 What Is It Like to Be a Bat? 25 Functionalism and Qualia 26 From “Identity and Necessity” 27 Form, Function, and Feel 28 Epiphenomenal Qualia 29 Can We Solve the Mind–Body Problem? 30 Physicalism and the Cognitive Role of Acquaintance II Mental Causation Introduction 31 From The Passions of the Soul 32 From The Search after Truth 33 A New System of theNature and the Communication of Substances 34 From Critique of Pure Reason 35 From “On the Hypothesis That Animals Are Automata” 36 Mental Events 37 Mind Matters 38 Making Mind Matter More 39 The Myth of Nonreductive Materialism 40 Causation in the Philosophy of Mind 41 From “Physicalism from a Probabilistic Point of View” III Mental Content — Introduction 42 From On the Soul, Book 3 43 From Meditations on First Philosophy and Replies to Objections I-IV 44 From An Essay Concerning Human Understanding 45 From A Treatise of Human Nature 46 From Discourse on Metaphysics and Correspondence with Arnauld 47 From “How to Make Our Ideas Clear” 48 From “The Theory of Objects” 49 From The Problems of Philosophy 50 From Mind and the World Order 51 From “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’” 52 From “Individualism and the Mental” 53 Methodological Solipsism Considered as a Research Strategy in Cognitive Psychology 54 Misrepresentation 55 From “(Nonsolipsistic) Conceptual Role Semantics” 56 Social Content and Psychological Content 57 Wide Computationalism 58 From A Slim Book on Narrow Content IV Innateness and Modularity — Introduction 59 From The Meno 60 From Posterior Analytics, Book II, Chapter 19 61 From Replies to Objections V and “Notes Directed against a Certain Program” 62 From An Essay Concerning Human Understanding 63 From New Essays on Human Understanding 64 From Phrenology 65 From The Language of Thought 66 The Psychogenesis of Knowledge and Its Epistemological Significance 67 On Cognitive Structures and Their Development: A Reply to Piaget 68 What Is Innate and Why: Comments on the Debate 69 From Rules and Representations 70 From Modularity of Mind 71 Against Modularity 72 The Modularity of Thought and the Epidemiology of Representations 73 Dissociation and Modularity: Reflections on Language and Mind V Associationism and Connectionism Introduction 74 From Leviathan 75 From An Essay Concerning Human Understanding 76 From A System of Logic 77 From The Principles of Psychology 78 The Appeal of Parallel Distributed Processing 79 Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture: A Critical Analysis 80 The Constituent Structure of Connectionist Mental States: A Reply to Fodor and Pylyshyn 81 Connectionism and the Problem of Systematicity: Why Smolensky’s Solution Doesn’t Work 82 What Is the “D” in “PDP”? A Survey of the Concept of Distribution 83 Connectionism, Eliminativism, and the Future of Folk Psychology Index